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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis, I demonstrate how the numerous forms of oppression are grounded in a 
hierarchical and binary thinking that permeates racism and sexism and that is present throughout 
the feminist movement.  It is this biased thinking that creates further divide among diverse social 
groups resulting in a foundation for justifying oppressive practices.  I argue that the human rights 
framework is the best by which to defeat this problematic thinking, fostering a collectivity 
among disparate people and establishing a more appropriate footing upon which to face the 
problems of feminism.  In the end, I claim that there must be a global commitment to end 
oppression that begins with educating people as to the unjustified harm created by biased and 
binary thinking and to the effectiveness of a human rights approach in eliminating any validation 
of oppression. 
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Introduction 
In the wealth of feminist theory that exists, there is a great deal of emphasis placed on the 
identification and exploration of the various forms of injustice against women.  Feminist theory 
is rich with content concerning the unjust and oppressive nature of patriarchy and gender 
distinctions, the socialization of people in accordance with those distinctions, and the unequal 
treatment of minorities as a result of the oppressive majority.  While life for many women has 
improved, there continues to be a sense that the problems central to current feminist debate are 
growing while any chance at resolution is rapidly diminishing.  Bourgeois white women 
struggled for the right to vote and work outside of the home while ignoring race and class issues.  
While white and black women in the Western part of the world seek recognition of their 
oppression, women in “third-world” countries continue to suffer such cultural practices as 
binding of the feet and genital mutilation.  Additionally, there are countless debates in feminism 
over the defamation of women through pornography, unequal treatment in the workplace, 
reproductive rights, homosexuality, and the list continues.   
While it is indeed essential to recognize and to remind humanity of the problems against 
which feminism continues to struggle, there is relatively little focus on how to resolve these 
problems.  Thus, there is need for a feminist methodology that will remain attentive to the 
different forms of oppression while proposing a solution toward which all people can 
collectively stride.  It is pivotal that this methodology include a deeper sense of urgency about 
how to overcome the many forms of oppression against women instead of simply naming and 
offering an explication of those injustices.   
 In her book, Analyzing Oppression, feminist philosopher Ann Cudd claims that at its 
most basic level “oppression consists in the existence of unequal and unjust institutional 
  
 
 3 
 
constraints.”1  Perhaps more important than discussing the existence of said constraints is 
questioning their source of strength and their endurance over time.  Cudd attributes the 
perpetuity of oppression not only to dominant social groups, but also to the subordinate groups 
upon whom these constraints are forced.  She claims that “oppression often seems to flourish 
when it is kept in place not by armed struggle, but by willing, or at least grudging, compliance by 
the oppressed.”2   
After taking a graduate class in Women’s Studies, Cudd’s comment here proved 
particularly striking to me.  While discussing in class one day the many injustices suffered by 
minorities in the United States, one student declared that because she understood the U.S. to be 
founded upon racist and sexist ideals, any hope for change, any desire for equality among people 
was pointless; there could never and will never be any justice in this nation.   
Perhaps this young graduate student is right.  Perhaps the United States is doomed to 
failure.  But how disheartening that a class full of passionate students, of students seemingly 
moved by the heightened injustice in their country, would turn that passion inward to function 
only as “grudging compliance,” rather than as a catalyst for change.  How frustrating to watch 
their downward gazes and slow nods in acknowledgment of the thoughts of this student.  Week 
after week this three-hour class passed in constant heated conversation over the injustice of 
institutional oppression in the U.S., making the general agreement of the other students 
somewhat confusing to me.  When I asked why this student thought that the country could never 
improve from its present state and why there could be no progress when people (such as us) did 
want there to be change, I was instructed by another student to “stop with this liberal we-need-to-
save-the-world bullshit.”  Perhaps that is an example of angry grudging compliance.             
                                               
1
 Ann Cudd, Analyzing Oppression, 52. 
2
 Ibid., 11. 
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It may appear naïve and seem futile and foolish to think that there could be any real 
justice among such diverse people, but being hopeful for change and equality is more 
constructive than being grudgingly compliant.  There is not much point in being so moved and 
passionate about the rights of others, detesting the injustice of oppression and the power 
structures that keep that oppression alive, when all that one prefers to do is voice an opinion in 
an enclosed room without any hope that things could be different outside its doors. 
While oppression is experienced in a variety of ways by different groups of people, it is 
generally understood as constituting those institutional constraints that serve to confine or 
restrain the liberties of particular groups of people.  Targeting oppression is a fundamental 
ingredient in the feminist pursuit for justice.  Analyzing oppression is an adequate starting point 
for feminist theory; a point from which feminist theory appropriately can begin to combat its 
harmful effects on minorities, and particularly on women.  However, it is my belief that feminist 
philosophy cannot and should not stop there with proving the great significance and injustice of 
oppression.  Detailed attention needs to be given to its source, its endurance, and ways by which 
it may be defeated.     
In this thesis, I will begin by examining oppression, its roots and the ways by which it 
continues to thrive in society.  I will demonstrate how oppression is predominantly grounded in 
and strengthened by a hierarchical binary or dichotomous thinking, and illustrate how this theory 
applies regarding white bourgeois feminism, black feminism, and global feminism.  
Subsequently, I will discuss how the problematic hierarchies of each may be addressed by 
applying a human rights framework to feminist struggle.  In the end, I will argue that it is by 
adopting and educating in favor of a human rights discourse that we may confront the many 
issues of feminism in hopes of coming to some resolution.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
Oppression: Its Foundation, Its Strength, Its Endurance 
Before discussing oppression and how it applies to diverse peoples and in particular, to 
diverse women, it is necessary to identify its origins.  Iris Marion Young and Ann Cudd dedicate 
a great deal of attention to the foundational factors of oppression. Because individuals are often 
thought to experience injustice as members of a group, it is necessary to explore in some detail 
the social group and its role in and relation to oppression.  The discussion of social group 
formation as integral to understanding oppression is present in the work of both Young and 
Cudd.  Each includes a detailed analysis of social groups and the impact that these groups have 
on individual identities and on human behavior.  While a great deal of political philosophy 
overlooks or dismisses the importance of defining social groups in theories of oppression, 
preferring to focus on the individual, social group analysis offers a more concrete foundational 
account of oppression.3   
Young begins her discussion of oppression by distinguishing between social groups and 
aggregates of people.  She defines a social group as “a collective of persons differentiated from 
at least one other group by cultural forms, practices, or way of life.”4  These cultural forms and 
traditions signify a common history or set of beliefs that is shared by all members of the group.5  
Members then form a unity and identify with one another based upon their social status that is 
derivative of their common culture and history.    
Different from the unity and solidarity that is observed in the social group, there are also 
capricious classifications of people called aggregates, which are not relevant to theories of 
oppression.  Young explains that aggregates merely categorize individuals according to 
                                               
3
 Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 43; and Ann Cudd, Analyzing Oppression, 33. 
4
 Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 43.  
5
 Ibid., 44. 
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coincidental common features.  Aggregates classify people according to shared attributes, such 
as hair or eye color, the type of house one lives in or the type of car one drives.6   
To further clarify this distinction, it is helpful to look to the discussion of social groups 
by Joseph Raz and Avishai Margalit in their essay “National Self-Determination.”  Raz and 
Margalit set out to identify what constitutes a group as being suitable for self-government, and in 
so doing, they designate several characteristics of the social group.  Though the topic of self-
government is outside the scope of this thesis, the social group criteria as listed in this specific 
essay help to make clear the social group/aggregate distinction that Young proposes.  The essay 
includes six criteria, the first four of which are applicable to this exploration of social groups.   
Like Young, Raz and Margalit begin by first asserting that members of a group are those 
who share a common culture that influences their way of life and comprises, at least partly, the 
individual members’ identity.7  In the second characteristic, they claim that people growing up 
within the group will acquire the culture, taking part in its traditions and sharing a common 
history with other members. The third characteristic is that group membership must be mutually 
recognized by the group and the individual members.8     
The fourth feature proves particularly significant in relation to Young’s definition of the 
social group as it gives attention to how the group functions to promote certain behavior from its 
members.  The fourth feature states that membership must be “highly visible” and must have a 
role in shaping the members’ self-identity. Under the fourth feature, Raz and Margalit explain 
that group membership must aide members in their understanding of who they are, of why they 
act or react in a particular way, and of how they acquire their tastes and manner. 9  The first three 
                                               
6
 Ibid., 43. 
7
 Margalit and Raz, “National Self-Determination,” The Journal of Philosophy 87, no. 9 (September 1990): 443. 
8
 Ibid., 444. 
9
 Ibid., 445-6. 
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criteria in conjunction with the fourth establish that individual membership must demonstrate the 
culture, the way of life, and the behavior acceptable to the specific group, therefore revealing 
how one’s membership is “highly visible” and able to be recognized by others.   
Now, the first four criteria help to differentiate the social group from an aggregate by 
emphasizing the importance of a cultural connection and shared understanding among group 
members.  Where an aggregate is comprised of members according to purely arbitrary criteria, a 
social group must share a common culture, tradition and behavior among recognized group 
members.  A good example of this distinction can be seen between an aggregate of women and a 
particular social group of women.  Being biologically female is a necessary and objective 
attribute demonstrating that one belongs to an aggregate of women regardless of race, class or 
cultural differences.  However, the individuals in this aggregate may be divided into social 
groups based on shared experiential and cultural factors that are not relevant in composing an 
aggregate of women.  This distinction is particularly significant in feminist debate as black 
feminism highlights that white feminism often writes about the plight of “women” as such, thus 
ignoring or giving relatively little attention to the diverse experiences of women within that 
aggregate.  What is important to make note of here is that the criteria from Raz and Margalit 
obtain; that is, together women do not comprise a social group unless they demonstrate a shared 
history, culture or self-understanding.  
In this way, different from aggregates of people, group membership has a role in 
constituting one’s identity. Group membership includes one’s “particular sense of history, 
affinity, and separateness, even the person’s mode of reasoning, evaluating and expressing 
feeling, are constituted partly by her or his group affinities.” 10   While Raz and Margalit and 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
10
 Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 45. 
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Young each point out the influence of social groups on individual identity, it is important to 
realize that claiming that social groups have a role in shaping one’s identity does not mean that 
people lack individuality or lack a sense of identity outside of the social group to which they 
belong.11  Rather, this theory of social groups recognizes the influence that membership has on 
developing one’s identity, claiming that “identity is constituted relationally, through involvement 
with—and incorporation of—significant others and integration into communities.”12 
Young makes the distinction between social groups and aggregates to emphasize that not 
all groups of people are joined together due to random commonalities. While aggregates are of 
little or no explanatory value in Young’s theory of oppression, the analysis of social groups is 
essential to developing an adequate understanding of the foundation and endurance of 
oppression.  According to Young, in addition to their building unity based on a shared history 
and culture, members of these groups further bind together through the recognition of their 
differences with other people or with other social groups.  Group solidarity strengthens by 
acknowledging how the members’ experiences, beliefs or ways of life contrast with those of 
other collectives, and consequently each group designates its members as “the people.”13  
This description of how the unity of social groups is intensified demonstrates the point at 
which social groups have the potential to become vehicles of oppression.  There is nothing 
inherently problematic about recognizing similarities with others and forming groups based on 
those similarities or likewise with recognizing differences with others and forming groups based 
on those differences.  However, when members not only acknowledge differences with other 
people or with other groups, but when they see those differences as irreconcilable, as designating 
                                               
11
 Ibid. 
12
 Steven Epstein, “Gay Politics, Ethnic Identity: The Limits of Social Constructionism.” Socialist Review 17 (May-
August): 29. 
13
 Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 43. 
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members of other groups inferior as persons, and as offering a legitimate basis for denying others 
valued resources and opportunities on the basis of their group membership, the groundwork for 
oppression is established.  That is, when members consider themselves to be “the people,” this 
signifies that anyone or any group existing outside of that collective is wholly “other.”  This in 
turn introduces the development of a hierarchical and binary thinking which serves to validate 
the mistreatment and oppression of selected groups of people by other more socially dominant 
groups.  This mindset consists of dividing and ranking people or social groups due to the 
presence of similarities or differences and further presents a justification for treating people in 
accordance with those differences—as superior/inferior, normal/deviant, etc.  There will be more 
said on the problem of hierarchical binary thinking after looking a little further into social group 
influence.     
As Raz and Margalit point out in their fourth criteria, social groups also function to 
promote or evoke particular behavior in their members.  In addition to the influence that social 
groups have on identity then, these groups have a great deal of impact on members’ actions and 
reactions.  In her work Analyzing Oppression, Ann Cudd focuses her theory on the relationship 
between oppression and social groups before highlighting the behavioral influences of the social 
group on its members.  She defines oppression as “a harm through which groups of persons are 
systematically and unfairly or unjustly constrained, burdened or reduced by any of several 
forces.”14  The “several forces” to which Cudd refers include “social institutions, practices and 
norms in social groups by social groups.”15   Cudd further claims that humans oppress one 
                                               
14
 Ann Cudd, Analyzing Oppression, 23. 
15
 Ibid. 
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another because of their dependence on and their reluctance to “extract themselves” from social 
groups.16  
Where Young recognizes the distinction between social groups and aggregates, Cudd 
focuses her discussion solely on social groups, distinguishing between voluntary and non-
voluntary social groups.  Voluntary social groups are those in which members voluntarily 
organize around a common connection, share common goals or ideas and recognize that together 
they comprise a social group.  Conversely, non-voluntary social groups are those composed of 
“collections of people” based on ethnicity, gender, class, demographic, etc.17  While members of 
voluntary social groups work collectively to achieve particular ends, members of non-voluntary 
social groups experience collectively advantages or disadvantages based strictly on their being 
members of particular social groups.  Moreover, members of non-voluntary social groups are 
subject to various social constraints that shape and influence the “legal rights, obligations and 
burdens, stereotypical expectations, wealth, income, social status, conventions, norms and 
practices” of those members.18  Further Cudd explains, “the voluntariness of social groups 
admits of degrees,” depending upon the amount of freedom members have in leaving the group 
or in joining another group.19   
Cudd includes a more detailed explanation of social groups than Young does, delving 
into the different constraints that apply to different groups of people.  She explains that social 
groups and institutions are examples of social facts that impose certain constraints on the actions 
of individuals.20  Social constraints, according to Cudd, stand “as the preferences, choices, 
common beliefs, strategies, and payoffs that agents consider in making decisions or as the default 
                                               
16
 Ibid. 
17
 Ibid., 41. 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 Ibid., 44. 
20
 Ibid., 33. 
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assumptions that agents use when they act on intentions that are not fully or rationally 
considered.” 21   These constraints function to impose limitations on the suitability of particular 
actions by particular people and are highly susceptible to change as the social climate changes.  
Take, for example, the change in the social climate in the United States regarding the perception 
of and the outrage against, Muslim men and women after the Oklahoma City bombings or after 
the attacks on the World Trade Center.  Before these acts of destruction in the United States, 
Muslim men and women were often regarded with suspicion by non-Muslim people because of 
the differences in their dress and in their lifestyle.  After, the social climate altered and so too did 
the constraints on non-Muslim citizens and their actions toward Muslim men and women. What 
was once suspicion or ignorance quickly gave way to hatred and rage at the occurrence of any 
problem or destruction in the United States whether or not Muslim men and women were 
directly involved. Cudd explains that because of this propensity for change in social constraints, 
any theory of oppression must account for social facts as either endogenous or exogenous.22  
That is, the theory must clarify that some facts are based on natural or internal differences, while 
others develop as a result of current hegemony.   
Cudd further claims that social constraints are not “unchangeable facts,” but are 
exogenous variables that people are forced to confront in their daily lives.23  It is important then 
to recognize that social constraints may be generated as a result of the fallible assumptions, 
beliefs, and prejudices of dominant social groups.  While these constraints may not possess a 
factual or concrete footing, they remain potent in their ability to motivate people according to the 
                                               
21
 Ibid., 41. 
22
 Ibid., 33. 
23
 Ibid., 42. 
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corresponding advantages and disadvantages that they force upon non-voluntary social group 
members.24      
To clarify how social constraints function one need only look to the everyday prejudices 
of people.  The familiar bumper sticker displaying “♂+♀= Marriage” reveals why Cudd 
describes social constraints as exogenous and as constricting.  This bumper sticker conveys the 
belief that there is no other socially acceptable form of marriage other than that of a heterosexual 
couple.  It says that the only significant social fact about marriage is that it exists between a man 
and a woman rather than any other mutually loving and committed couple.  Nevermind that this 
constraint allows for couples who may be abusive toward each other; as long as a couple is 
heterosexual, the legality and/or the sanctity of marriage remains intact.   
Similarly, the causal efficacy that Cudd attributes to social constraints can be seen by an 
extension of the previous example.  Suppose that a homosexual individual is raised in a family 
that lives according to the “♂+♀= Marriage” motto.  Because that individual is connected to and 
cares for her family, she may strive to live in accordance with this heterosexist belief, fearing the 
rejection of or estrangement from her family.  Therefore, because hegemonic social constraints 
do not allow for additional socially acceptable alternatives, they perpetuate the prejudices that 
infuse oppression by promoting certain beliefs and influencing corresponding actions.25    
An objection to the theory that oppression is a constituent of the social is seen in 
methodological individualism.  While there are some “weaker” versions of methodological 
individualism, such as structural or institutional individualism, that do admit the social influence 
of collectives on the individual, methodological individualism in its strongest form calls for the 
                                               
24
 Ibid. 
25
 Ibid., 52. 
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explanation of social concepts and phenomena in terms of individuals.26  Cudd further explains 
that proponents of methodological individualism “argue that since social groups are ‘nothing 
more’ than groups of individuals, we ought not to construct theories that explain using social 
groups.”27   
While Cudd does not disagree with the individualist belief that groups are ultimately 
reducible to individuals, she says that this fact in no way detracts from the explanatory 
significance of social groups regarding human behavior. 28  Cudd argues that particularly with 
non-voluntary social groups, it is undeniable that social facts influence the behavior of non-
voluntary group members. 29   
To illuminate Cudd’s point here: during an afternoon spent watching football with a 
friend of mine and four of his male friends, I became increasingly offended and frustrated by the 
sexual and derogatory conversation among the men concerning women from the area and women 
on television.  After the men left, I found myself wondering at what age exactly boys learn to 
talk that way about girls and about women.  Surely, that acquisition of language does not just 
naturally develop in each individual at a certain age.  Rather, it is a byproduct of growing up in a 
society in which men and boys are taught their superiority and the consequent inferiority of 
women.  This example illustrates Cudd’s earlier claim about exogenous social constraints.  As 
Cudd points out, these social constraints “help to explain individual actions by revealing the 
incentives that individuals have by virtue of their membership in non-voluntary social groups.”30  
In the case with the five men, it would conflict with the dominant social norm for one of the men 
in that particular setting (i.e. watching football, drinking beer, etc.) to chastise the others for their 
                                               
26
 Lars Udehn,“The Changing Faces of Methodological Individualism,” Annual Review of Sociology 28 (2002): 498. 
27
 Ann Cudd, Analyzing Oppression, 33. 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Ibid., 47. 
30
 Ibid., 33. 
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crude, sexist behavior when due to hegemonic social fact, that type of behavior is aligned with 
the social constraints particular to that social group.      
Addressing the methodological individualist objection shows that oppression is 
appropriately explained in terms of social group interaction.  So, while “it is fundamentally the 
individuals” who suffer at the hand of oppression, they suffer “only as members of social 
groups.” 31  To clarify, Young’s theory defines the “us versus them” thinking that designates one 
group as superior to another, resulting in the formation of non-voluntary social groups that Cudd 
claims function as vehicles of oppression.  Thus, social groups coupled with the problematic 
hierarchical and binary thinking together serve as a necessary condition for oppression.    Social 
groups can exist in a non-oppressive role when members are voluntary members and when they 
do not designate themselves as “the people” based on their differences with other individuals or 
other social groups.  Thus, it is not the formation of social groups, but their role in perpetuating 
oppression that must be examined.   
                                               
31
 Ibid., 23. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
Applying the Theory: Hierarchical, Binary Thinking in the Feminist Movement 
 
In Justice and the Politics of Difference, Iris Marion Young identifies what she refers to 
as the “five faces of oppression:” powerlessness, exploitation, violence, marginalization and 
cultural imperialism.32  The order in which the five faces appear here varies from the order in 
which Young places them, but it is an order that corresponds very closely to the progression of 
the feminist movement.   
The feminist movement began as the fight of white, bourgeois women in response to a 
patriarchy that designated the feminine as weak, child-like, powerless and dependent.  The 
movement pushed on to attack the exploitation of and violence against women in the household, 
in the workplace, and in pornography, but remained ever-focused on the dominant white 
perspective.  In response to this white feminism, Black women demanded that their 
marginalization be recognized, and that the movement stop excluding them from the struggle 
against oppression.  Finally, in more recent years, the movement has begun to branch out to 
address the discrimination and mistreatment of women in other countries, particularly those in 
“third-world” countries.  However, a “big sister” mentality is often put into place in helping 
“third-world” women out of their strife.  Thus, the movement has retained the superior/inferior 
hierarchical binary from which it began.  No matter how well-intentioned Western feminism has 
been, it was and in many respects continues to be, a movement that subscribes to a dichotomous, 
hierarchical framework. 
In The Second Sex, Simone de Beauvoir highlights the influence of the male-oriented 
society in dictating the feminine to be essentially “Other.”33  Beauvoir argues against the social 
                                               
32
 Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 48-61. 
33
 Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, xxii. 
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constraints that place men and force women into a master/slave dichotomy.34  Here the 
superior/inferior binary is established as the defining relationship between men and women.  The 
exogenous social “facts” that portray women as “frivolous, infantile, irresponsible” then lock 
women into a submissive role—one in which they can remain suppressed and subordinate to 
men.35    
The concept of the Other is a prevalent theme throughout The Second Sex, and one that 
grounds the many socially constructed characteristics of women.  The Other encompasses 
everything that is not man.  It is that which is foreign to man, that which he wishes to control, 
that to which he designates himself as master and Absolute.36  The Other is a concept that thrives 
off of ambiguity, and as such, is open to the interpretation of men.  For example, men may see 
women as sexual objects, as caretakers, and/or as mothers.  As long as a woman remains 
subordinate and knows her existence as essentially Other, she will do best to conform to the 
wants and desires of her master.   
It is this designating of women as essentially Other that white-bourgeois feminism set out 
to defeat.  The feminist agenda at this stage in the feminist movement attacked the notion that 
women need exist as the subordinate counterpart in the master/slave hierarchical dichotomy.  
Women fought for equality and recognition as autonomous individuals capable of working, 
voting, and obtaining social and economic freedom.   
As the movement progressed, white-bourgeois feminists continued their search for social 
and economic autonomy.  In Justice, Gender and the Family, Susan Moller Okin constructs a 
feminist critique of John Rawls’s Theory of Justice.  Okin predominantly takes issue with 
Rawls’s portrayal of the ideal family as one that is organized in accordance with traditional 
                                               
34
 Ibid., 57-8. 
35
 Ibid., xxx. 
36
 Ibid., xxii. 
  
 
 17 
 
gender roles.  Okin argues that posing the father and husband as the head of the family with the 
mother and children as subordinate and obedient members, prohibits women from being equal 
citizens with men.  Thus, citing the hierarchically structured, patriarchal family as the ideal 
primary social institution strengthens the master/slave and superior/inferior hierarchical binaries, 
teaching in the early stages of child development that boys are superior to girls.  
Again in Okin’s work the influence of the social group plays out in the same manner that 
Young and Cudd described.  The family unit is the first social institution for children, and while 
it is not problematic as such, it becomes so when promoting sexist ideals.  The fight for equality 
according to the early feminist movement then, was one fought to achieve economic, social, and 
political freedom.  It was, and in many ways continues to be, a fight for women to have a choice 
in their life pursuits and to be free to live an independent life should they want to do so.   
 In the work of Beauvoir and Okin, the feminist battle is focused on moving away from 
the socially constructed concept of woman or of feminine as one that signifies inferiority and as 
such renders women weak or powerless.  Additionally, a prominent aspect of the white feminist 
perspective is the focus on the sexualized discrimination of women.  Catharine MacKinnon’s 
Only Words is based entirely on addressing the degradation and sexualized violence of women 
through pornography.  MacKinnon argues against the subject/object hierarchical binary that 
identifies women solely as objects of sexual desire and sexual perversion.  Like Beauvoir and 
Okin, MacKinnon sets out to diminish the belief that women are powerless objects to be used 
according to man’s wants and needs.  Further, MacKinnon argues against the exploitation and 
subordination of women through pornography, saying that because pornography subordinates 
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women, it should not continue to be protected as a form of free speech under the First 
Amendment.37 
In her discussion of pornography and its harmful effects to women, MacKinnon also 
draws on racial discrimination, but only insofar as it too evokes sexual arousal in the 
perpetrator.38  She asserts that “much racist behavior” is motivated by a sexual gratification or 
arousal that stems from racist crimes.39  To defend her claim, MacKinnon states: 
Consider the pure enjoyment of dominance that makes power its own reward, reports of the look of 
pleasure on the face of racist torturers, accounts of the adrenalin high of hatred and excitement that 
survivors of lynchings describe having seen, the sexual atrocities always involved…Once the benefits and 
functions of much racial murder, torture, hatred, and dominance, perhaps even economic supremacy, are 
exposed as sexual…what of racism is left to explain? Something, but what? 40 
This passage illustrates how MacKinnon draws racial discrimination into her discussion as yet 
another mode of sexual oppression.   
MacKinnon’s inclusion of racial discrimination here provides an example of what is a 
common black feminist critique of white feminism.  In her essay, “Race and Essentialism,” 
Angela P. Harris argues that by focusing on the sexual oppression of “women,” MacKinnon 
ignores issues of race, class, and sexual orientation.  By drawing upon racism only insofar as it 
applies to sexism, MacKinnon “simultaneously recognizes and shelves racism, finally 
reaffirming that the divide between men and women is more fundamental.”41 Harris goes on to 
                                               
37
 Catharine MacKinnon, Only Words, 11. 
38
 Wendy Brown, “The Mirror of Pornography,” States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity, 85.   
39
 Catharine MacKinnon, Only Words, 63. 
40
 Ibid., 63-4. 
41
 Angela P. Harris, “Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory,” Stanford Law Review 42, no. 3 (February 
1990): 598.   
  
 
 19 
 
say that MacKinnon’s “color blind” approach designates black women as white women “only 
more so.”42 
Moreover, bell hooks directly addresses this critique of the white feminist perspective in 
Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center.  Hooks explains that race and class discrimination 
have largely been omitted from feminist struggle because many feminists view sexist oppression 
as the “primary contradiction, the basis of all other oppressions.”43  This concept of sexism as 
existing somehow prior to all other forms of oppression may be seen in the work of MacKinnon 
in her discussion of sexualized racism and in her assertion that much of racist behavior evokes a 
sexual response in the perpetrator.  MacKinnon offers no concrete support for the claim that 
those who commit racist crimes do so in order to attain sexual pleasure, and as such, she draws 
racial discrimination into her discussion as yet another mode of sexual oppression, rather than 
recognizing it as itself a problem.  Thus, it seems that MacKinnon over-generalizes here and 
perhaps is too eager to defend sexuality as a primary vehicle for an oppressive patriarchy. 
MacKinnon’s mistake, and the mistake of all other feminists who subscribe to the same 
belief, is that their vantage point is too narrow.  While sexism may be a prominent form of 
oppression because it is the form that most women experience, that prominence does not 
constitute sexism as the basis for all oppression.  For example, while it is accurate to say that 
pornography objectifies and degrades women, for MacKinnon to say that racist crimes fall under 
that same classification because they trigger responses of enjoyment and gratification is non 
sequitar.  Saying that racist crimes evoke enjoyment in the perpetrator, does not prove that that 
enjoyment is sexual in nature, nor does it prove that because the enjoyment is present, that the 
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crime is sexist in nature.  When one attempts to subsume additional counts of oppression under 
that which she knows and experiences, then she creates a “hierarchy of oppression” and she 
reinforces the marginalization of other minorities.44   
Black feminists further argue that while the feminist movement claims to be in support of 
“women’s” rights and “women’s” equality, it is a movement that is focused only on the needs of 
white, middle-class women.  It is a movement that is centered strictly on gender differences and 
the quest for social and economic independence.  Black feminists question why this movement 
initially ignored class and race discrimination, as well as the interests and voices of women of 
color.  Because the early feminist movement solely addressed gender issues rather than the 
interplay of gender, race and class, the movement left many women overlooked, silenced, and 
their opinions repressed.   
Black feminists like bell hooks and Patricia Hill Collins argue against this 
marginalization of women of color in feminist debate.  In her essay “The Social Construction of 
Black Feminist Thought,” Collins explains that Black women struggle against two concepts 
central to oppression.  The first “claims that subordinate groups identify with the powerful and 
have no valid independent interpretation of their own oppression,” while the second designates 
the oppressed as “less human than their rulers and, therefore, less capable of articulating their 
own standpoint.”45   
Collins’ wording of these concepts gives yet another pertinent example of the accuracy of 
Young and Cudd’s analyses of social groups and their relationship to oppression.  In addition to 
highlighting the validation of oppression from the dominant, white patriarchy, these concepts 
demonstrate the interaction of two separate hierarchical binaries: superior/inferior and 
                                               
44
 Ibid. 
45
 Patricia Hill Collins, “The Social Construction of Black Feminist Thought,” Signs 14, no. 4, Common Grounds 
and Crossroads: Race, Ethnicity, and Class in Women’s Lives  (Summer, 1989): 746. 
  
 
 21 
 
Absolute/Other.  The order of these two statements illustrates why it is important to take issue 
with hierarchical, dichotomous thinking rather than with the social group.  To clarify, the first 
statement, which reflects the superior/inferior binary by juxtaposing “subordinate groups” versus 
“the powerful,” demonstrates the type of mindset that must exist prior to exhibiting oppressive 
behavior.  This is the mindset that enables people to justify their actions regardless of the 
perverse nature of those actions.  The second statement, through its use of phrases such as “less 
human” and “less capable,” reflects the same language that Beauvoir argues against in her early 
work in feminist thought; language that is indicative of the Absolute/Other hierarchical binary.  
Further, the ordering of the two statements is illustrative of Young’s earlier point concerning 
groups who strengthen upon their members’ recognition of their differences from others.  The 
superior/inferior hierarchical binary lays the foundation for acting out and justifying oppressive 
actions against others while the Absolute/Other hierarchical binary further divides social groups, 
viewing “subordinate group” members not just as inferior, but as wholly Other.  Thus, the 
concepts that Collins identifies reveal, by the same criteria given by Young and Cudd, the 
problematic combination of biased mindsets and corresponding discriminatory actions. 
Hooks, and other Black feminists, maintain that without considering issues of race, class 
and sex, one cannot eliminate the patriarchal mindset that is at the heart of discrimination and 
oppression.  Hooks explains that there needs to be a shift in methodology, not just in attitude, so 
that the needs of all those suffering from oppression may be heard.46  Because white feminists or 
“privileged feminists” do not speak to diverse audiences they are failing to see the 
interconnections among race, class and sex.47  Therefore, focusing primarily on gender 
difference, as do many white-bourgeois feminists, proves an insufficient basis on which to build 
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feminist theory because it neglects other forms and acts of oppression.  By dismissing the various 
modes of oppression, white women exploit their status, demonstrating that “like black men,” 
they can assume “the role of the oppressor or the oppressed.”48   
In the end, hooks calls for recognition of all types of oppression and asks feminist 
theorists to modify their perspectives accordingly.  She tells black women to “recognize the 
special vantage point [their] marginality gives [them] and make use of this perspective to 
criticize the dominant racist, classist, sexist hegemony as well as to envision and create a 
counter-hegemony.”49  She urges a foundation of feminist theory built on the notion of collective 
responsibility.50  Thus, she claims that it is the responsibility of all people regardless of race, sex 
or class to gain recognition of the interconnectedness of individuals, and to use the knowledge of 
that interconnectedness as the key to defeating patriarchy and oppression.                   
 The Black feminist critique, therefore, focuses on the continued marginalization of Black 
women in the feminist movement.  What Collins and hooks hope to illuminate is that a 
movement that promotes equality among all people, a movement that purports to end oppression 
cannot be a movement that is strictly from the dominant white perspective.  The movement must 
be attentive to the diversity of women and the diversity of their experiences, and therefore must 
strive to address the biased thinking that is at the root of oppression, rather than only the sexist 
consequences or byproducts of it.    
Similar to the Black feminist call for the incorporation of diversity in white feminism, the 
same attention to diversity is also needed to adequately address the rights and interests of so-
called “Third World women.”  As recent feminist theory turns its attention to an examination of 
the treatment of women in other cultures and other parts of the world, it is again faced with the 
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challenge to let go of dominant mainstream perspectives, to eliminate the cultural imperialism 
that underlies its agenda.  An example of the growing interest in and concern for international 
women is seen in Okin’s Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?  Okin presents an essay by the 
same title as the book, and includes a variety of feminist responses to her work.  In her essay, 
Okin reveals two difficulties concerning the relationship between multiculturalism and feminism.  
The first difficulty is one that Okin discusses openly, one that she questions and analyzes.  
However, the second difficulty is one that is reflected in her work, but of which she may not 
necessarily be aware.   
Okin begins her discussion, clarifying what she understands as feminism and 
multiculturalism.  She states that feminism is the belief that “women should not be disadvantaged 
by their sex, that they should be recognized as having human dignity equal to that of men, and 
that they should have the opportunity to live as fulfilling and as freely chosen lives as men 
can.”51  The aspect of multiculturalism with which Okin takes issue is the protection of minority 
cultures by guaranteeing individual and “special” group rights.  Okin thus questions: when the 
rights of the individual conflict with the rights of the group, at what point is it appropriate to 
fight for the protection of individual rights over special group rights?  That is, she speculates as 
to when the protection of the individual overrides respect for cultural differences.52   
In response to those who advocate group rights, she says there are two issues left 
uncovered.  First she says that these advocates treat cultural groups as “monoliths” and as such 
overlook the entitlement of the individual to her basic rights.  Further, as is customary in her 
feminist theory, Okin expresses a great deal of concern over group rights advocates leaving 
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women and girls completely vulnerable and unprotected in the private sphere.53  To demonstrate 
her cause for concern here, Okin discusses the male dominance that is expressed through such 
cultural practices as polygamy, clitoridectomy, and the forced marriage of pre-pubescent girls.  
These cultural traditions, she argues, serve only the needs and interests of men without regard for 
the effects they have on girls and women.  As such, Okin warns against the liberal tendency to 
preserve cultural practices when these practices are founded upon gender inequalities. 54    
It seems that overall, Okin’s concern for the harsh mistreatment of women in other 
countries is well-placed.  However, interspersed throughout her article are statements that 
contain cultural imperialist undertones.  For example, Okin argues that many of the world’s 
cultures, including the Western cultures, were founded upon patriarchal, sexist traditions; 
however, Western women fought against those traditions, rather than accept them, and 
consequently helped progress the culture away from those ideals.55  While Okin clarifies that she 
does not mean to say that Western cultures do not still contain sex discrimination, she uses this 
point to demonstrate that women of other cultures should follow the example of Western women 
who fought against patriarchal traditions.  Further, in contrasting the Western lifestyle with that 
of women in other cultures, she says: 
women in more liberal cultures are, at the same time, legally guaranteed many of the same 
freedoms and opportunities as men.  In addition, most families in such cultures…do not 
communicate to their daughters that they are of less value than boys, that their lives are to be 
confined to domesticity and service to men and children…This situation…is quite different from 
that of women in many of the world’s other cultures 56 
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It is claims and comments such as these that allow for Okin to be interpreted as asserting the 
cultural imperialism of Western societies. 
Here again, though the face of oppression has changed, the hierarchical binary remains as 
a result of the “cultural imperialism” reflected in the perspective of a Western woman talking 
about “Third-World” women.  Cultural imperialism is a form of oppression that relies on several 
hierarchical dichotomies, including superior/inferior, Absolute/Other, normal/deviant and 
center/periphery.  The center/periphery hierarchical binary is one that continues to reflect the 
marginalization of a subordinate group—in this instance, Western feminism designates the 
center, while “third world” women comprise the periphery.   
 In her essay, “Is Western Patriarchal Feminism Good for Third World/Minority 
Women?” Azizah Y. Al-Hibri, attacks the position of Okin and accuses her of universalizing 
Western principles.  She critiques Okin, saying that her essay is clearly written from the 
“perspective of the dominant cultural ‘I,’ a Western point of view burdened with immigrant 
problems and the human rights conflicts they engender.”57   
 Al-Hibri warns that addressing feminist concerns in other cultures requires more than a 
mere extension of Western principles and practice.  She faults Okin for conflating religious 
versus cultural practices or sentiment, illustrating that Western feminism needs to become more 
informed as to the origin of religious or cultural difference.  That is, Western women cannot look 
at a veiled Muslim woman and immediately assert that that woman must be uninformed since 
she is living in compliance with sexist practices.58  As a Muslim, Al-Hibri suggests that in order 
to reform sexist traditions in Muslim countries, Western feminism must respect the religious and 
cultural sentiments of the people while “recognizing the sanctity of the first and the flexibility of 
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the second.”59  She advises then, that before Western feminism observes through its narrow 
Westernized lens the religious and cultural constraints of women in other countries, it must work 
to inform itself about the origin of those constraints in order to see if they are, in effect, 
oppressive. 
 It is important to note that Okin focuses the majority of her essay on cultural practices 
such as clitoridectomy; wedding young, prepubescent girls; and the forced marriage of rape 
victims to their perpetrators.  She does mention as an aside in her essay discrimination against 
women in different religions.  So, when Al-Hibri offers this critique of Okin, it is somewhat 
unfair because she is addressing a secondary argument that Okin makes without acknowledging 
it as such.  Conversely, Al-Hibri’s critique is highly pertinent to feminist debate because it names 
several problem areas for Western feminism and warns against a mere extension of Western 
values to other countries and other people.  Thus, Al-Hibri encourages Western women to start 
listening to rather than dictating the perspectives of women in other countries. 
As is shown throughout this chapter, each of the faces of oppression when considered in 
this order responds to the different aspects of oppression that are addressed by diverse women in 
the feminist movement.  What is important to recognize is that integral to each of these faces is 
the existence of a foundational hierarchical, binary thinking that keeps division and justifies 
unequal treatment between and among social groups.   
Because the argument presented in the first chapter and applied here in the second is that 
the origins of oppression lie in hierarchical, binary thinking and in its influence on group identity 
and on behavior, the focus of the next chapter will be to present a framework that eliminates the 
problematic dichotomies that have permeated society as well as the feminist movement.  In order 
to defeat this biased thinking, there must be a reconciling of difference and unity, a call to 
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collectively battle against oppression while recognizing the experiences and voices of many 
diverse women.  In the next section, I will explore how that unity may be achieved without 
discounting for diversity.   
  
 
 28 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
 
The Effectiveness of a Human Rights Framework 
 
 In her essay “Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them To Be?” 
Sally Haslanger provides an analytic examination of gender and race and whether they serve any 
legitimate purpose as social constructs.  Haslanger begins her essay by citing four concerns that 
will be the focus of her work and that should be the focus of any feminist, anti-racist 
methodology.  First, the methodology must identify and explain persistent inequalities among 
people due to social constructs such as gender and race.  Second, it must be sensitive to the 
similarities and the differences among people.  That is, the methodology must not create a false 
sense of unity by focusing on only the similarities of diverse women while ignoring their 
differences, and it must not view differences as constitutive of irreconcilable tensions.  Thirdly, 
the methodology must give an account of how social constructs are embedded in a wide range of 
social phenomena.60  And finally, the theory must address the “need for accounts of gender and 
race that take seriously the agency of women and people of color of both genders, and within 
which we can develop an understanding of agency that will aid feminist and antiracist efforts to 
empower critical social agents.”61 
 Haslanger’s concerns as listed here offer guidelines that are essential to any feminist, 
anti-racist methodology hoping to be effective both in theory and in practice.  The first chapter 
here cites social groups as potential vehicles of oppression and therefore addresses Haslanger’s 
third concern.  The second chapter illustrates the hierarchical, binary thinking that underlies the 
different forms of oppression and as such addresses Haslanger’s first concern.  However, 
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Haslanger’s second and fourth points have thus far gone largely unexplored and will be 
discussed in this chapter.   
Recognizing similarities as well as differences is certainly no easy task and is often a 
point of great contention in feminist theory.  As is seen in the previous chapter, white bourgeois 
feminism is often accused of subsuming the experiences and needs of Black and Third-World 
women under the white feminist agenda.  While white bourgeois feminists may think they are 
including minority women in the feminist pursuit for justice, their inability to recognize the 
diversity of these women contributes to the oppression of Third-World women and women of 
color by acting in accordance with the superior/inferior dichotomy.  White bourgeois feminists 
assume a position of authority and speak for minority women instead of listening to and 
accepting that these women are capable of thinking and speaking for themselves.   
This difficulty of acknowledging both unity and difference can be seen in the work of 
Young.  In her feminist theory, Young argues in favor of a “politics of difference” requiring that 
“equality as the participation and inclusion of all groups sometimes requires different treatment 
for oppressed or disadvantaged groups.”62  Young’s politics of difference is constructed in 
response to the “assimilationist ideal” of Richard Wasserstrom in “On Racism and Sexism.”63   
In his article, Wasserstrom argues that racism and sexism may be combated and perhaps 
even eliminated by thinking of race and sex as having the same social significance as one’s eye 
color.64  He explains that removing the social implication of race and sex results in the loss of 
political rights, obligations, and institutional benefits in accordance with those social constructs.  
Wasserstrom applies the assimilationist ideal first to race, saying that if people were to recognize 
race as the equivalent of eye color, racism would not exist, and there would be no need for 
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programs or policies which protect against prejudice and discrimination.65  He claims that while 
this ideal would surely abolish racism, he is uncertain about its effectiveness when applied to 
sex.  He says, “it must be acknowledged that to make the assimilationist ideal a reality in respect 
to sex would involve more profound and fundamental revisions of our institutions and our 
attitudes than would be the case in respect to race.”66  Wasserstrom thus believes that sexism is 
more deeply embedded in society as is evident with the presence of sex roles “as a central part of 
the society’s ideology.”67  He claims that removing the social significance of sex would require 
the elimination of sex roles, of marriage laws requiring the union of one man and one woman, 
and of the understanding that the virtues of a good man are different from those of a good 
woman, etc.68     
In her critique of Wasserstrom’s account, Young clarifies that Wasserstrom opts for this 
assimilationist ideal for three reasons.  First, this ideal reveals the arbitrary nature of group-based 
social distinctions.  Second, the assimilationist view holds a standard of equality and justice that 
does not vary according to exogenous social variables and is not relative to particular social 
groups.  Third, this account maximizes individual choice, allowing for people to develop 
themselves without being constrained by dominant social norms.69  This assimilationist view, 
according to Young, demonstrates an “ideal of universal humanity” that, in her opinion, serves to 
deny natural difference and rejects the “reality or the desirability of social groups.”70  
Young takes issue with Wasserstrom’s entire approach.  She says if gender and race 
become socially insignificant, there will exist “no political rights or obligations connected to race 
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and sex…no important institutional benefits associated with either…no reason to consider race 
or gender in policy or everyday interactions.”71  As a result, Young claims that eliminating the 
significance of gender and race is neither desirable nor a solution to racism and sexism.72   
Therefore, she argues that the assimilationist ideal should be forfeited for a politics of difference.  
The politics of difference requires “institutional changes” which include “group representation in 
policy-making and an elimination of the hierarchy of rewards.”73  Further, Young claims that 
different from the assimilationist view or a “liberal humanism” which ignores race, gender, 
religious and ethnic differences, the politics of difference places further emphasis on the need for 
oppressed groups to have their own separate organizations, excluding those from privileged 
positions.  Young’s view thus embraces difference and as such, she argues that the emphasis on 
difference will reconfigure the implications of its meaning, not to posit a particular people as 
“other,” but to come to encourage a social acceptance of heterogeneity.74    
There are several problems with Young’s understanding here.  First, concerning her 
critique of Wasserstrom, drawing an analogy between sex and race and the social significance of 
eye color does not deny difference.  Difference is still present, but it no longer carries the weight 
of having social implications, advantages or disadvantages.  Losing the social significance of sex 
and race means that there can be no arbitrary justification for treating or viewing one group of 
people as superior or inferior to another group of people.  For example, if one’s sex were the 
social equivalent of eye color, then the discrepancy in the pay scale between men and women 
would be socially unacceptable.  While the disparity in pay is recognized today, it continues to 
exist and is slow to decrease because of the socially accepted power relations in the man/woman 
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hierarchical dichotomy.  The Institute for Women’s Policy Research (IWPR) reports that in 2002 
the median wages of women working full-time, year round were 76.2 percent of the median 
wages of men who worked full-time, year round.75  According to IWPR, between the years of 
1983-2000, “approximately 45 percent of the wage gap between men and women could not be 
explained by the combined effect of differences in human capital, industry and occupation, 
unionization, and work hours.”76  That 45 percent reveals that sex discrimination remains a factor 
in the wage gap between men and women.  The power structure that infuses this pay scale 
discrepancy is perhaps reliant on the traditional patriarchal assumption that women ought to be 
the primary caretakers of the family while men ought to be the primary providers. Therefore, 
adjusting the difference in the pay scale between men and women also involves acknowledging 
and deconstructing the traditional power relations between men and women.   
Conversely, adjusting a difference in the pay scale between a blue-eyed versus a brown-
eyed person performing the same job would perhaps be executed without much objection as 
there are no power relations, no hierarchical binaries that exist between blue-eyed and brown-
eyed people.  Hence, Wasserstrom’s argument in favor of removing the social implications of 
sex and race is not an argument that ignores differences or disbands social groups, but it 
eliminates the traditional justifications for accepting and acting in accordance with unjust power 
relations.77   
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Young’s concern over the loss of political rights and institutional benefits associated with 
race and sex and the subsequent exclusion of certain social groups in policy-making also seems 
to be a misunderstanding of Wasserstrom’s account.   Young’s difficulty here appears to be that 
she is not making a distinction between biological sex and social sex, or gender.  When 
Wasserstrom says that the assimilationist ideal would eliminate the social significance of sex, he 
does not deny biological sex differences, but he drives the point that gender differences should 
be rendered insignificant.  Though he never uses the term, he notes the implications of the 
assimilationist ideal as always involving what feminists now refer to as gender—the social 
construct of sex.78   In the non-sexist society promoted by the assimilationist ideal “persons 
would not be socialized so as to see or understand themselves or others as essentially or 
significantly who they were or what their lives would be like because they were either male or 
female.”79  Therefore, if gender and race lose their social significance, then theoretically, there is 
no justification for and no reason to include prejudice concerning political rights, institutional 
benefits, policy-making, etc.  
Moreover, if Young is concerned that losing the social weight of gender may result in the 
loss of the reproductive rights of women, this argument does not seem to obtain.  Doing away 
with gender removes the validation of the unjust treatment of women in accordance with the 
superior/inferior and subject/object hierarchical dichotomies.  Without the social implications of 
gender that have thus far fueled traditional patriarchy, women can no longer be seen as infantile 
or childlike or as somehow unable to exercise their own rights or make their own decisions as to 
what is best for their lives and/or bodies.  Thus, thinking of sex and race as having the same 
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social implications as eye color would defuse these dichotomies, and women would no longer be 
subject to the supposed authority of men when considering women’s reproductive rights.80     
With the use of his assimilationist ideal, Wasserstrom clearly demonstrates an attempt to 
end oppression or socially oppressive forces where Young’s theory does not.  As was previously 
stated, Wasserstrom is concerned with eliminating the rewards and consequences that social 
constraints attribute to a particular gender or a particular race.  Wasserstrom is attempting to 
dispel hierarchical binaries, thereby ensuring that people are eligible for the same opportunities 
in life.  It is not clear then why Young assumes that removing the advantages and disadvantages 
linked to gender and race will ultimately result in the elimination of social groups.  Perhaps her 
confusion rests in the fact that Young does not distinguish between voluntary and non-voluntary 
social groups as is seen in Cudd’s account.  Wasserstrom’s view seems to eliminate the 
problematic non-voluntary social group that collectively experiences rewards or consequences 
based on the social reception particular to that group.  His view does not, however, call for the 
elimination of social groups as Young is perhaps too quick to suggest.  In the end, Wasserstrom’s 
view removes the hierarchical binaries that justify the conception of women and minorities as 
secondary citizens to white men, acknowledges that some, not all social groups are problematic, 
and calls for the elimination of those harmful, non-voluntary social groups.  By Wasserstrom’s 
account then, women and minorities retain their rights, while losing the prejudices that serve to 
keep them oppressed.    
Wasserstrom’s ideal, therefore, is preferable to that of Young.  Young’s politics of 
difference, while seemingly well-intentioned, serves to perpetuate the very hierarchical, 
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dichotomous thinking that is so problematic.  While it certainly is important to embrace 
difference and to accept a methodology and a practice that accounts for diversity rather than 
attempting to subsume it, to focus one’s theory entirely on the preservation of difference allows 
for greater tensions and perhaps further grounds for discrimination among social groups.  
Young’s theory is overly optimistic about the possibility that organizing strictly according to 
social group differences will eventually lead to a greater appreciation for heterogeneity.  By 
dismissing the elimination of the social significance of sex and race and arguing in favor of an 
emphasis on group differences, Young demonstrates the very struggle with reconciling unity and 
difference against which Haslanger warns.     
Unlike Young’s account, Wasserstrom’s theory corresponds well with Haslanger’s 
second concern.  That is, Wasserstrom demonstrates that it is possible to have diverse people 
without acknowledging that diversity as warranting particular advantages and disadvantages.  
Removing the social implications of sex and race presents a goal for feminist, anti-racist theory.  
Still, a methodology is needed to attain that goal—a methodology that will reinforce the 
importance of recognizing the differences among people while not designating those differences 
as falling into some hierarchical binary.   
In “Reclaiming a Human Rights Culture: Feminism of Difference and Alliance,” Mallika 
Dutt argues for a human rights discourse as the effective footing on which to establish a unifying 
account of feminism without neglecting diversity.  Dutt discusses several areas in which 
feminism should organize around the human rights paradigm: popular education, violence 
against women, economic and social rights, and health and reproductive rights.  In Dutt’s view, 
popular education should be used as a vehicle through which women become empowered.  She 
says that humanity ought to begin its fight against oppression by educating women to the fact 
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that their existence is not inferior to that of men.  They must be informed of their basic rights and 
of that to which they are ultimately entitled as human beings.81  Note that this stance on the 
education of women is one that will address not only the plight of Western women, but of all 
women.  While experiences of oppression differ according to social groups, Dutt’s view here 
explains that our first task is to wrest the superior/inferior dichotomy from its pervasive role in 
global gender relations.   
When applying the human rights framework to violence against women, Dutt explains 
that this paradigm has repeatedly proven its strength by stirring international interest and 
awareness of gendered and sexualized violence.  The use of this paradigm brought violence 
against women to the “forefront of the UN agenda,” caused its recognition in the Vienna 
Declaration on Human Rights and “led to the appointment of a UN Special Rapporteur on 
Violence Against Women.”82  Arguing against oppression from a human rights framework then, 
eradicates the possibility of justifying the abuse or exploitation of women and minorities.   
Demanding the recognition of oppression as a human rights issue sends a global message 
that is not easily ignored.  Oppression becomes a reality to all people, rather than a problem 
solely for those who directly experience it.  To illustrate why this paradigm is more effective and 
indeed more preferable to those methodologies that continue to argue from a “special interest” 
perspective, it is helpful to look again at the work of Catharine MacKinnon in Only Words.   
MacKinnon’s agenda here is to demonstrate that pornography elicits violence against 
women and minorities by associating acts of violence with sexual arousal.  She argues against 
the protection of pornography as an act of free speech, claiming that any language or act that 
promotes inequality, especially those that serve to threaten and defame a particular group of 
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people, should not be legally pardoned.83  While MacKinnon is certainly correct in arguing 
against the exploitation and objectification of women and minorities, her work consists mainly of 
arguments continually asserting the harm that pornography and sexualized violence forces upon 
only women and minorities.  If women and minorities are understood as fulfilling the object role 
of the subject/object binary and are thus understood as being somehow less human than those 
who fulfill the subject role, then it will not matter to the dominant social group that the 
subordinate social groups are harmed.  Focusing on how and why the pornographic industry and 
sexualized violence are harmful only to specific groups, rather claiming this as a violation of 
human rights, seems to allow MacKinnon’s arguments to be more easily overlooked.  These 
issues thus retain their position in the periphery, remaining “special interest” problems that are 
largely ignored by an industry and society that adheres to the superior/inferior and subject/object 
hierarchical dichotomies. 
Conversely, the human rights paradigm proves more effective by removing the “special 
interests” aspect of oppression.  Keeping violence against women and minorities in the periphery 
rather than demonstrating why this violence is a violation of human rights is perhaps why 
pornography can be acceptably dismissed as “only words.”  If one does not first argue against 
women and minorities being the “object” half of the subject/object dichotomy or the “inferior” 
half of the superior/inferior dichotomy, then any arguments made against the unjust treatment of 
women and minorities lose their vigor and consequently, we see that the sexualized crimes 
against which MacKinnon argues do not get the attention nor the retributive action that they 
deserve.   
The strength of the human rights paradigm is seen again in Dutt’s discussion surrounding 
economic and social rights.  Here Dutt drives the point that bringing women’s issues to light in 
                                               
83
 Catharine MacKinnon, Only Words, 71. 
  
 
 38 
 
the economic and social realms demonstrates that the injustices suffered by women are a public, 
not a private concern.  She cites the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a suitable 
foundation around which people can and should unite to combat the social and economic 
mistreatment of women and other minorities.84  The Declaration contains thirty articles 
delimiting the basic rights, entitlements and freedoms of all people.  The following excerpts are 
taken from the Declaration:  
Article 1. All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with 
reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood. 
 
Article 23. (2) Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work. 
 
Article 25. (1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being 
of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary 
social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, 
widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control. 
(2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether 
born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection. 
 
Because each person is at least entitled to these human rights, it is not left to the 
discretion of any dominant people or hegemony to deny these rights to others on the basis of 
gender, race or class differences.  Thus, regardless of gender, class, or cultural disparity, each 
person is warranted in her claim to be guaranteed these provisions.  This understanding in 
conjunction with the education requirement helps to build upon a global intolerance against the 
unequal treatment of women across cultural divides.      
While the human rights discourse seems a sound basis from which to battle against 
oppression, there are several criticisms that raise pertinent points about this framework.  Inderpal 
Grewal objects to this paradigm in her essay “On the New Global Feminism and the Family of 
Nations: Dilemmas of Transnational Feminist Practice.” Grewal argues that the human rights 
framework does not avoid the very hegemonies that prove so detrimental to women’s rights, and 
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instead functions as a universalizing discourse that continues to estrange Third-World women.  
She claims that arguing for women’s rights as human rights is meant “to assert the rights of the 
individual as a private, autonomous being” and many women in various parts of the globe are not 
seen as independent, autonomous individuals.85  Thus, according to Grewal, the human rights 
discourse reinforces the marginalization of Third-World women.   
Grewal further criticizes the human rights discourse for promoting the “moral 
superiority” of Western women who, she claims, will inevitably use this paradigm to create a 
false sense of sisterhood, so as to remain the older and wiser sister to the unknowing and 
underdeveloped Third World sisters.86  Grewal argues that the human rights paradigm can be 
used to enhance unjust power relations between the Western world and so-called developing 
countries.  She claims that there is no guarantee that the superpower mentality of some will be 
dispelled given the emphasis on or the organizing around the human rights paradigm.87 
This criticism of the human rights discourse is also present in Chandra Talpade 
Mohanty’s “Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses.”  Mohanty 
argues that while it is important for women to organize across boarders, it is necessary to keep in 
mind the differences of women and to resist promoting a homogenization of women’s 
experiences under a problematic hegemony.  Mohanty centers her discussion on three analytic 
principles which she observes and which she urges Western women to avoid when extending 
their academic discourse across international borders.88 
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 Addressing first the legitimacy of the category “women,” Mohanty questions whether it 
is appropriate or even desirable for women to organize around gender.  She finds the category of 
“women” problematic for two reasons.  First, she argues that to assume that women exist as an 
already coherent group sharing “identical interests and desires, regardless of class, ethnic or 
racial location” further strengthens the patriarchal dichotomy that is posed between women and 
men.89  This method of promoting the collective identity of women seems to reflect the reduction 
of difference and the perpetuating of the “absolute other” that were the concern of both Young 
and Grewal.  Moreover though, Mohanty argues that if women are organizing under this 
category as a result of their shared oppression, then the focus of the feminist discourse 
surrounding this category shifts to proving the shared oppression rather than working to combat 
it.90  Thus, Mohanty wants to move away from an oppression-based organizing, citing that it 
dwells too heavily on women as objects, as universal dependents or as victims.91  Instead, she 
argues for the need to formulate a Sisterhood that takes into account the historical and political 
differences among diverse women. 
 Mohanty’s argument here illustrates the final of Haslanger’s concerns: that feminist, anti-
racist theory must include accounts of gender and race that will appreciate the agency of all 
women regardless of the country or culture to which they belong and that will foster the 
empowerment of these peoples in combating their diverse experiences of oppression.  
Furthermore, Mohanty’s critique builds upon that of Grewal, offering criticism that is absent 
empty and unsupported claims and presenting key warnings and suggestions for the human rights 
discourse.  Grewal’s arguments, by contrast, prove more accusatory than constructive, making 
such claims as that the United States “assumes that certain foreign cultures are very oppressive to 
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women, unlike [itself]” and that the United States considers itself a “unified nation free of violent 
practices against women, except for domestic violence and rape.”92   
Making unsupported accusations against the United States detracts from an important 
claim underlying Grewal’s work—a claim which Mohanty more clearly defines; namely that by 
promoting a universalizing discourse, Western women continue to ostracize women in 
developing countries by refusing to recognize these women as capable of naming and leading 
their own struggles against oppression.  Highlighting this need to examine the motivations 
underlying Western methodology, Mohanty argues that Western feminism makes “a colonialist 
move in the case of a hegemonic first-third world connection in scholarship.”93  According to 
Mohanty, as a result of this commitment to universalizing “women’s” oppression, Western 
feminism neglects the historical contexts of the diverse women and cultures that it examines.  
She argues that organizing women around their common oppression is not only unjustified, but it 
continues to perpetuate the very dichotomy that it attempts to dispel.  Mohanty claims, therefore, 
that this Western agenda ultimately sets up the United States and European feminists as subject, 
while designating “third world women” as objects to be analyzed from a supposedly superior or 
at least more informed perspective.   
While this common criticism from Grewal and Mohanty is important, it does not 
necessarily discount the effectiveness of the human rights position, though it calls attention to 
and warns against a potential downfall of the framework.  Both Grewal and Mohanty are correct 
in questioning who will be enforcing the human rights discourse and what power relations will 
come into play during its use.  However, neither examines the potential for the human rights 
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framework to deconstruct those unjust power structures as is a main point with Dutt’s argument 
in favor of this paradigm.     
Dutt anticipates the criticism that Grewal and Mohanty pose, saying that “universalisms 
such as human rights are criticized either because all individual experience is said to be 
contingent on the location of the person involved and/or because cultural or other differences 
between people need to be respected.”94  While it is indeed important to acknowledge the 
criticism offered by Grewal and Mohanty warning against a Western cultural imperialism, the 
fact remains that Western dominance is neither a necessary, nor a sufficient condition of 
applying the human rights framework to feminist struggle.  In her words, Dutt claims “There 
need not be a contradiction in the assertion that human rights are universal and that they 
recognize difference.”95  I do think that Dutt is correct here.  The human rights framework is not 
mutually exclusive with acknowledging and accepting diversity.   
It seems that, particularly in the work of Grewal and Young, there is a misunderstanding 
that permeates the discussion surrounding the human rights framework and that needs some 
clarification.  That is, Grewal and Young, and surely many others, need to understand that 
claiming that women experience oppression all across the world does not constitute the claim 
that there is one particular form of oppression against all women as one type.  The human rights 
framework both acknowledges and defends the diversity as well as the unity among not only 
women, but humanity.  A human rights discourse demands that no matter what the culture, no 
matter who the oppressed, everyone is entitled to specific rights regardless of race, gender or 
class.   
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Without neglecting difference, “we must connect our experiences and organize with 
people in other parts of the world to better counter the economic, social and political forces at 
play.”96  In this way, the human rights paradigm is not a commitment to universalizing in the 
way that Grewal and Mohanty suggest, and it is not a way by which Western feminism may 
project its own sentiments about oppression onto other women and other cultures; rather, the 
human rights framework organizes individuals in order to have the numbers and the voices 
necessary to guarantee that the problems of feminism be heard and that they be understood as the 
serious local and global threats that they are. 
As such, so long as Western feminism stops projecting local conceptions of oppression 
onto other women and other cultures, the human rights framework is a way by which to build 
solidarity among women and among humanity.  This discourse proves an effective method for 
breaking down unjust power relations by demanding the recognition of the most basic rights of 
all people and by refusing to acknowledge the positing of any group as superior to any other.  If, 
as is argued in the first chapter, the foundation of oppression is a hierarchical, binary thinking 
that is reflected in social group identity and behavior, then the human rights framework is the 
necessary construct through which to defuse the prejudiced thinking that allows for people to 
construct unjust power relations in accordance with misguided, biased perceptions.   
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Conclusion 
The human rights framework provides the tools necessary to overcome and eliminate 
oppression.  If used correctly, this framework disallows any justification of powerlessness, 
exploitation, violence, marginalization and cultural imperialism.  That is, provided that 
individuals are held to the minimal requirements of the rights as stated in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, there cannot be a universalizing of experiences, nor grounds for a 
dominant country or people forcing its beliefs or its perceptions onto any other country or 
people.  The effectiveness of this framework lies precisely in its eliminating any justification for 
problematic universalizing or for uncontested cultural imperialism.97  The human rights 
methodology deconstructs the hierarchical binaries that are the foundation of oppressive 
relations, and as such creates grounds for building a solidarity among people that is necessary for 
the complete elimination of oppression. 
A great deal of feminist literature expresses the view that oppression cannot be defeated 
unless people collectively struggle against it without denying their diversity.  Cudd claims that 
the object cannot be for humanity to live a meaningful life “in spite of or in the face of 
oppression,” but that people must collectively work to end oppression.98  Hooks also supports 
this call to collectively organize saying that “establishing a unity among people will defeat 
hierarchical dualities and will replace these dualities with an ethic of communalism, shared 
responsibility, and mutuality.”99   
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A problem throughout the feminist movement has been that forming this unity always 
allowed for the silencing of voices and the oversight of the experiences of some women, whether 
it was/is ignoring the circumstances of black women by white women, or overshadowing women 
of “developing countries” by Western women.  This issue has become of particular interest and 
concern in feminist theory, but the literature surrounding this problem seems more focused on 
pointing out this flaw rather than suggesting ways to address it.   
It is my view that the best way to form unity while acknowledging disparity is through 
the human rights framework.  This methodology is certainly no “quick-fix:” with problems as 
large and as deep as racism and sexism, there is no quick fix.  The human rights framework, 
however, offers a solid ground upon which people can collectively struggle against and 
eventually end oppression while maintaining their sense of diversity.  If people begin to 
recognize the harm that can be caused by hierarchical, binary thinking, and they accept the 
human rights discourse as the appropriate footing upon which to dispel that prejudiced thinking, 
then we will begin to gain ground in the battle against oppression.   
From here, people need to build upon a collective commitment to end oppression, and 
perhaps the most powerful and effective way by which to foster that commitment is through 
education.  In addition to stating that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights should be 
“disseminated, displayed, read and expounded principally in schools and other educational 
institutions, without distinction based on the political status of countries or territories,” Article 26 
of the Declaration states: 
Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and 
friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United 
Nations for the maintenance of peace. 
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There is no more powerful tool, no more effective method to build upon a global intolerance of 
the exploitation and maltreatment of people than through education.  The Declaration should be 
something that children are taught throughout school in order to cultivate this intolerance and to 
promote change.  Of course this means that the changes will be seen from generation to 
generation and will not occur as rapidly as we would like, but the change will be occurring.  
People will begin to live and to teach their children to value and respect human rights, and 
eventually an ideal like Wasserstrom suggests will have the potential to come into effect.    
 It is important to note that intolerance in this instance, while a term that is usually 
avoided when talking about a non-racist and non-sexist methodology, is meant to urge people 
against an unquestioning multiculturalism.  In order to accept diversity and to respect cultural 
disparity, we need not also accept or be tolerant of the abuse, neglect, and mistreatment or 
misrepresentation of particular groups of people.  By adopting the human rights framework, we 
become intolerant of violations of those rights in the sense that we reject any justification for 
human rights violations based on the binary, hierarchical thinking that supports oppressive 
practices.  It is important to differentiate that being respectful and mindful of difference does not 
mean being tolerant of the ways in which some cultures or some groups of people violate the 
human rights of others.   
 In order to dispel hierarchical, dichotomous thinking, feminist theory that serves as a 
catalyst for social change must urge people to appreciate diversity as well as to recognize the 
power and the significance of unity.  By removing the justification for the mistreatment of 
particular social groups, the human rights paradigm makes concrete what so many wrongly see 
as malleable.  It unifies people and creates solidarity at the human level, eliminating the notion 
that “different” means “inferior.”  Thus, educating people about the importance of human rights 
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rather than a willing or grudging acceptance of hierarchical, binary thinking will ultimately 
empower people and stir them into collective action over a principle of entitlement.  
 
Not even Ghandi or Martin Luther King, Jr. could be said to have ended oppression on 
their own; it was their ability to lead masses to protest the oppression that changed the world. 100 
-Ann Cudd  
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